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SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises because the district court wrongly dismissed two Missouri 
citizens’ constitutional challenge to the “Individual Mandate” provision in the 
recently-passed federal healthcare law.  The Individual Mandate forces individuals 
to buy federally-defined health insurance policies.  If individuals do not do so, the 
government imposes a monthly financial penalty on them. 
Samantha Hill said she does not currently have health insurance and does 
not want to comply with the requirement that she buy insurance coverage she does 
not want or need.  Plaintiff Peter Kinder – who is Missouri’s Lieutenant Governor 
– qualifies for insurance coverage through the state employee’s plan.  But, 
Lieutenant Governor Kinder’s existing insurance coverage ceases when his current 
term ends in 2013.  Thus, when the Individual Mandate becomes enforceable in 
2014 it would require Peter Kinder to buy a federally-defined insurance policy.   
This appeal concerns: (1) whether these Missouri citizens have standing to 
challenge this federal mandate that requires they buy an insurance policy; and, (2) 
whether our Constitution grants Congress the power to force individuals to buy 
medical insurance.   
To adequately address these important and pressing legal issues, Plaintiffs 
request thirty minutes of oral argument.  
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The trial court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims,  (Joint Appendix (“JA”) 
82-137), was based on (1) officers of the United States being the defendants, and 
(2) this action arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) by suing those of the Executive Branch 
responsible for PPACA’s administration and enforcement. 
Following briefing, the district court issued a memorandum and order on 
April 26, 2011, concluding Plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the federal 
law, and granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1).  (JA 459-79).  
The court also entered an order of dismissal that day, disposing of all of Plaintiffs’ 
claims.  (JA 481). 
Plaintiffs timely filed their notice of appeal three days later, on April 29, 
2011.  (JA 482-83).  Of the original seven Plaintiffs, this appeal involves only the 
claims of two Plaintiffs: Samantha Hill and Peter Kinder.  This Court’s jurisdiction 
is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides for jurisdiction over a final decision 
of a U.S. District Court.  This appeal is from a final order that disposes of all 
parties’ claims.  
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal concerns those provisions of PPACA that compel individuals to 
purchase a federally defined minimum health insurance policy or face financial 
penalties.   
1.   Standing.  Plaintiff Samantha Hill is a Missouri citizen without a 
medical insurance policy and she does not want to be forced to buy the health 
insurance coverage required by the Individual Mandate.  Plaintiff Peter Kinder is a 
Missouri citizen and his current eligibility for the state-run health insurance plan 
lasts only as long as his term as Missouri’s Lieutenant Governor, which ends 
January 2013.  The Individual Mandate becomes enforceable in 2014, and would 
apply to both Lieutenant Governor Kinder and Samantha Hill.  If Hill and Kinder 
do not buy the mandated insurance policies, PPACA imposes a financial penalty 
upon them.  Do these Missouri citizens have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Individual Mandate?   
? Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979); Braden 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009); Gray v. City of 
Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009); St. Paul Area Chamber of 
Commerce v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2006).   
? Sections 1302 and 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 163-68, 242-49 (2010), amended by 
Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029 (2010); Missouri Health Care Freedom Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 1.330 (2010). 
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2.  Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate.  Does Congress have the 
power to make individuals buy healthcare insurance or fine them for failing to do 
so?  More specifically,  
(a) Does the Individual Mandate exceed Congress’s constitutional 
authority under the Commerce Clause?  
 
(b) Are the “shared responsibility penalties” imposed on those who refuse 
to comply with the Individual Mandate a constitutional exercise of 
Congress’s tax power?  
 
(c) Does the Individual Mandate violate the Due Process Clause by 
infringing the right granted Missouri citizens under the Health Care 
Freedom Act not to be forced to buy healthcare insurance? 
 
? Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).    
? U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 18; § 9; amend. XIV, § 1.  Missouri Health 
Care Freedom Act, MO. REV. STAT. § 1.330 (2010). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Congress passed a sweeping overhaul of how healthcare is paid for and 
provided.  Under this law, the federal government assumed much of the role states 
traditionally held regulating healthcare.  The centerpiece of this expansion of 
federal authority over healthcare is a provision known as the “Individual 
Mandate.”  This provision compels individuals to purchase certain federally-
defined health insurance policies or face financial penalties.   
Peter Kinder and Samantha Hill are subject to this mandate.  They filed their 
constitutional challenge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Missouri on July 7, 2010, (JA 6-55), and filed an amended complaint on August 
18, 2010, (JA 82-137).  Defendants were sued in their official capacities as heads 
of those federal executive agencies charged with the administration and 
enforcement of PPACA. 
Defendants moved to dismiss arguing the court lacked jurisdiction (Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(1)) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) on January 18, 2011.  (JA 138-163).  The government 
also claimed the Individual Mandate was constitutional.  (JA 157-58). Plaintiffs 
filed their opposition on January 25, 2011.  (JA 164-312).  Defendants replied on 
February 4, 2011.  (JA 313-32).   
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The district court issued a memorandum and order on April 26, 2011, 
concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ amended 
complaint, and granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).  (JA 
459-79).  As to the Individual Mandate, the court ruled that Plaintiffs did not have 
standing because they were not injured by this provision of PPACA.  (JA 467-71).  
The court entered an order of dismissal that day.  (JA 481). 
Plaintiffs timely filed this appeal three days later, on April 29, 2011.  (JA 
482-83).  This appeal concerns whether two of the Plaintiffs, Samantha Hill and 
Peter Kinder, have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Individual 
Mandate.  And, it concerns whether the Individual Mandate is unconstitutional as 
applied to Samantha Hill and Peter Kinder. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO 
ISSSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
On Christmas Eve 2009, the United States Senate passed H.R. 3590.  Sixty 
Senators cast a vote in favor of H.R 3590, thirty-nine Senators voted against H.R. 
3590.  H.R. 3590 was referred to the United States House of Representatives. 
On Easter Week, March 21, 2010, the United States House of 
Representatives passed H.R. 3590 by a vote of 219 in favor and 212 opposed.  No 
Republican member of Congress voted in favor of H.R. 3590, and 34 Democrat 
members of Congress (including Missouri Congressman Ike Skelton) joined them 
voting against the bill.  On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed H.R. 3590, 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).1    
On March 21, 2010, the United States House of Representatives adopted 
H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 
(“HCERA”), in a parliamentary process called budget reconciliation.  HCERA 
contained revisions and additional corrections to H.R. 3590.  The House passed 
this HCERA Reconciliation Bill with a vote of 220 in favor and 211 opposed. No 
Republican member of Congress voted in favor of H.R. 3590 and 33 Democrat 
                                           
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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members of Congress joined them in voting against the bill.  President Obama 
signed HCERA into law on March 30, 2010.2 
PPACA includes the “Individual Mandate” that requires individuals to 
obtain or buy “minimum essential” healthcare coverage.  124 Stat. at 244 (26 
U.S.C. § 5000A(a)).  This mandate applies to every person except those: with a 
religious objection, not lawfully in the country, and those who are incarcerated. 
124 Stat. at 246 (26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)).  Anyone who fails to obtain a healthcare 
policy providing “minimum essential benefits” must pay monthly monetary 
penalties beginning 2014.  124 Stat. at 244-46 (26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b), (c)). 
The Individual Mandate requires individuals to purchase an insurance policy 
with one of four levels of benefits: “Platinum,” “Gold,” “Silver,” and “Bronze.”  
124 Stat. at 167 (§ 1302(d)(1)).  Certain individuals younger than 30 may satisfy 
the Individual Mandate by buying a “catastrophic” insurance policy.  This 
“catastrophic plan” must also include “essential health benefits determined under 
subsection (b)” and must also provide “coverage for at least three primary care 
visits.”  Id. at 168 (§ 1302(e)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)).  The “essential health benefits,” in 
addition to emergency services and hospitalization, must include: 
 
                                           
2 Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
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• “Maternity and newborn care;” 
• “Mental health and substance use disorder services, including 
behavioral health treatment;” 
• “Prescription drugs;”  
• “Laboratory services;” and 
• “Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.” 
See 124 Stat. at 163-64 (§1302(b)(1)). 
 After enactment of the Individual Mandate, the Missouri Health Care 
Freedom Act (“Freedom Act”) was passed by the state legislature and approved by 
the Missouri electorate at a popular referendum.3  The Freedom Act provides “No 
law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or health 
care provider to participate in any health care system.”   Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.330.1 
(2010).  “Health care system” is defined as: 
[A]ny public or private entity whose function or purpose 
is the management of, processing of, enrollment of 
individuals for or payment for, in full or in part, health 
                                           
3  The Freedom Act, put to the Missouri voters as Proposition C, was 
overwhelmingly approved by a 71.1% to 28.9% margin.  Official Election Returns, 
August 3, 2010 primary election, Missouri Secretary of State, 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/Enrweb/allresults.asp?arc=1&eid=283 (last visited June 
12, 2011).  
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care services or health care data or health care 
information for its participants[.]   
Id. § 1.330.5(3).  
 Plaintiffs Samantha Hill and Peter Kinder, are Missouri citizens who do not 
want to be forced to buy a federally mandated “platinum,” “gold,” silver,” 
“bronze,” or “catastrophic” insurance policy required by the Individual Mandate.  
Hill and Kinder challenge the constitutionality of the Individual Mandate and its 
penalty provision as: (1) exceeding power granted Congress under the Commerce 
Clause; (2) not being a valid exercise of Congress’s “taxing” power; and, (3) 
abrogating their rights as Missouri citizens under the Freedom Act. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Congress does not possess the power under the Commerce Clause to pass a 
law forcing individuals against their will to buy a specific healthcare insurance 
policy.  Individuals electing to not buy a product are not engaged in commerce. 
Congress does not possess the power under the Commerce Clause to “regulate” 
inactivity. 
Congress does not have the power under its taxing authority to impose a 
monetary penalty on those individuals who do not obey its mandate to buy 
insurance.  A “penalty” for not doing something Congress compels is not a “tax.” 
And, to the extent it is claimed this “penalty” is a “tax,” it is a direct tax in 
violation of the Constitution.   
Yet, Congress passed such a law forcing individuals to buy specific 
insurance policies.  And, the monetary penalty for failing to do so will be assessed 
beginning January 2014.  Peter Kinder and Samantha Hill are both subject to this 
mandate and both have said they do not want to buy the platinum, gold, silver, 
bronze or catastrophic insurance plans this law mandates.   The Freedom Act 
declares Missouri citizens cannot be forced to buy medical insurance against their 
will.  Both Peter Kinder and Samantha Hill are Missouri citizens protected by this 
law. 
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Forcing these Missouri citizens to buy this unwanted insurance or pay a 
penalty has caused each of them to suffer an “injury in fact.”  They, thus, have 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of this law in federal court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Samantha Hill and Peter Kinder have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a law that forces them to buy unwanted insurance  
under threat of monetary penalties. 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an 
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. 
.... 
The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this 
high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested 
legal right. 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)  
_______________________________ 
A. Standard of review is de novo. 
 
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s standing determination.  St. 
Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 2006).   
B. Legal standard. 
 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the reviewing court 
must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the 
complaint in favor of the complaining party.  Gardner v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 
294 F.3d 991, 993 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 
(1975)).  All inferences must be drawn in plaintiff’s favor when making a 
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determination on standing.  Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976, 983 (8th 
Cir. 2009). 
In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the court presumes all of the factual 
allegations concerning jurisdiction to be true and will grant the motion only if 
plaintiff does not allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction.  Titus 
v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993).   
Standing is shown “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 
successive stages of the litigation.”  Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 
585, 592 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 
(1992)).  Where jurisdiction is challenged in a motion to dismiss rather than a 
motion for summary judgment, the party asserting jurisdiction should be held to a 
“relatively modest” standard of asserting jurisdiction in its pleadings.  See Bennett 
v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170-71 (1997).   
“[G]eneral factual allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant’s conduct” will suffice to establish Article III 
standing at the pleading stage, “for on a motion to 
dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace 
those specific facts that are necessary to support [a 
contested] claim.” 
Constitution Party of South Dakota v. Nelson, 639 F.3d 417, 420-21 (8th Cir. 
2011) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).   
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C. The foundation of Article III standing is “injury in fact.” 
 The heart of standing is the principle that in order to invoke the power of a 
federal court, a plaintiff must present a “case” or “controversy” within the meaning 
of Article III of the Constitution.  Braden, 588 F.3d at 591.  “This ‘irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing’ requires a showing of ‘injury in fact’ to the 
plaintiff that is ‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,’ and 
‘likely [to] be redressed by a favorable decision.’”  Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
560-61).   
 “Injury in fact” is an invasion of a legally cognizable right.  Id.  The invasion 
of a legally protected interest must be both (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  A 
party challenging a statute in federal court satisfies the Article III requirement of 
an “injury in fact” by showing “a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a 
result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.”  St. Paul Area Chamber of 
Commerce, 439 F.3d at 485 (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 
442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).   
 When a statute is challenged by a party who is a target or object of the 
statute’s prohibitions, there is ordinarily little question that the statute has caused 
him injury and that a judgment preventing enforcement of the statute will redress 
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the injury.  Id.; Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 113 
F.3d 129, 131 (8th Cir. 1997).   
 Thus, the initial question in this appeal is whether Hill and Kinder have 
sufficiently alleged an “injury in fact” by being subject to the Individual Mandate.  
If so—because their injury would be “fairly traceable” to the Individual Mandate, 
and a judgment invalidating the Individual Mandate would redress their injury—
they have standing and the trial court’s dismissal should be reversed. 
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D. Samantha Hill alleged an “injury in fact” because the Individual 
Mandate forces her to buy unwanted insurance coverage.   
“I do not want to purchase any health insurance policy mandated by 
PPACA.”   
Samantha Hill, (JA 196) 
“[Samantha Hill] is instead compelled to purchase a more expensive health-
care plan she does not need and does not want.”   
Amended Complaint, ¶ 144 (JA 117).   
_______________________________ 
 
1. Hill clearly and unequivocally alleged an “injury in fact” in the 
amended complaint. 
Hill is subject to the Individual Mandate.  When the Individual Mandate 
takes effect on January 1, 2014, she will be forced to comply with the Individual 
Mandate by purchasing a medical insurance policy against her will.  If she does not 
buy the mandated insurance policy she is subject to significant monetary penalties 
for every month she does not comply with the mandate.  She thus has standing to 
challenge this federal law which says she must buy such an insurance policy.  
Samantha Hill specifically raised this constitutional challenge in Count Five of the 
amended complaint.  (JA 113-18).   
The trial court erroneously ruled that Hill has no standing because she “will 
be able to satisfy the essential benefits requirement by maintaining a catastrophic 
plan . . . .”  (JA 469).  The trial court claimed that, because the Individual Mandate 
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permits her to purchase a “catastrophic plan”—as such plan is defined by the 
Individual Mandate—Hill is denied standing to challenge this mandate.  The trial 
court thus erroneously conflated the type of “major medical” insurance policy Hill 
said she was willing to buy (one providing only major medical coverage which 
does not include the “essential minimum benefits” PPACA says must be part of a 
PPACA “catastrophic plan”)  with the insurance policy PPACA says Hill must 
buy.4  The district court simply ignored Hill’s allegation that the Individual 
Mandate forces her to buy insurance coverage for services and benefits she does 
not want.  See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 139, 141, 144.  (JA 116-17).  In other words, Hill 
alleged she did not want to buy any insurance plan that would satisfy the 
Individual Mandate. 
The district court’s ruling would be analogous to claiming that a person who 
said she was willing to buy only an economy car like a Ford Fiesta has no standing 
to challenge a law that forces her to buy a Chevrolet Suburban instead.  It is wrong 
to ignore the fundamental point — the law forces Samantha Hill to buy something 
she does not want to buy. 
                                           
4 The trial court took Hill’s allegation that she “desires to obtain only high-
deductible ‘major medical’ or ‘catastrophic’ health insurance coverage” out of 
context.  Am. Compl. ¶ 138.  (JA 116).   
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Samantha Hill said flat-out, “I do not want to purchase any health insurance 
policy mandated by PPACA.”  (JA 196).  Purchasing only that insurance coverage 
she is willing to buy will cause her to violate the PPACA’s minimum requirement.  
Thus, she violates the Individual Mandate and is subject to the financial sanction. 
And, for this reason, she has alleged an “injury in fact.”   
Hill alleged she would only buy high-deductible health insurance coverage 
because these plans are inexpensive, and more expensive health-care plans provide 
coverage she will not use and does not need.  Am. Compl. ¶ 139.  (JA 116).  Yet, 
the Individual Mandate requires Hill “to purchase a health-insurance policy that 
includes, inter alia, coverage in the following categories: 
• maternity and newborn care,  
• mental health and substance use disorders services…,  
• prescription drugs,  
• laboratory services, and  
• pediatric services including oral and vision care.”   
Am. Compl. ¶ 141 (JA 116).   
 “Should Samantha Hill not purchase this mandated health-care coverage, 
PPACA imposes a financial penalty upon her, and others similarly situated.”  Am. 
Compl. ¶ 142 (JA 116).  “Samantha Hill is denied the option of purchasing high-
deductible, major medical, health insurance policy and is instead compelled to 
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purchase a more expensive health-care plan she does not need and does not want.”  
Am. Compl. ¶ 144 (JA 117).   
These allegations satisfy long-standing precedent in this Circuit on standing.  
In particular, this Court has “entertained constitutional challenges where the statute 
clearly applies to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has stated a desire not to comply 
with its mandate.”  Gray, 567 F.3d at 987 (citing United Food & Commercial 
Workers Int’l Union v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 428 (8th Cir. 1988), Pursley v. City 
of Fayetteville, 820 F.2d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1987), and Blatnik Co. v. Ketola, 587 
F.2d 379, 381 (8th Cir. 1978)).   
These material allegations as to standing are also presumed true.  Gardner, 
294 F.3d at 993.  Moreover, the general allegations are presumed to “embrace 
those specific facts that are necessary to support [a contested] claim.”  Constitution 
Party, 639 F.3d at 420-21.  The trial court disregarded these presumptions and 
flatly ignored Hill’s explicit statement to the contrary; namely that she will not 
purchase a medical insurance policy with the benefits mandated by PPACA.  The 
assumption upon which the trial court premised its dismissal is directly contrary to 
Hill’s explicit allegation that she is “compelled to purchase a more expensive 
health-care plan she does not need and does not want.”   
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Section 1302(e) of the Individual Mandate requires that, even under a 
“catastrophic plan exception,” Hill must still purchase a health insurance policy 
that includes certain “essential health benefits,” which Hill does not want to buy.  
124 Stat. at 168.  These “essential health benefits” that must be covered include: 
• Maternity and newborn care; 
• Mental health and substance use disorder services, including 
behavioral health treatment; 
• Prescription drugs;  
• Laboratory services; and 
• Pediatric services, including oral and vision care. 
See 124 Stat. at 163-64 (§1302(b)(1) (A), (D), (E), (F), (H), (J)). 
These are the very services Hill alleges she does not want to be forced to pay 
for through a catastrophic plan.  See Am. Compl. ¶ 141 (JA 116);  ¶ 23 (JA 88) 
(Hill “has no need or desire to purchase or pay for insurance coverage containing 
infant and child care and, inter alia, lactation consulting and over 200 other 
preventative services”).  She does not want to buy a medical insurance policy 
providing coverage for treatments she does not need. 
Rather than pay premiums for routine health care and 
treatments she does not want or need, Samantha Hill 
desires to personally pay for any routine medical 
expenses that would not be covered by a major medical 
health-insurance plan, with the money she saves by not 
having to purchase the more expensive federally-
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mandated health care coverage used to pay her other bills 
and living expenses.   
Am. Compl. ¶ 21 (JA 87-88).    
Hill alleged an “injury in fact” in the amended complaint when she claimed 
the Individual Mandate forces her to buy expensive medical insurance covering 
unwanted services.  Moreover, because she is subject to the Individual Mandate’s 
impositions, there is no doubt that the injury is “fairly traceable” to the Individual 
Mandate and that a judgment declaring the Individual Mandate unconstitutional 
would redress her injury.  See St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce, 439 F.3d at 
485.  Hill thus has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Individual 
Mandate in Count Five and the district court was wrong to dismiss her claim for 
lack of standing.   
2. Hill’s affidavit further establishes her standing. 
 Hill’s allegations in the amended complaint, standing alone, satisfy the 
pleading requirements to establish standing.  Even so, Hill far surpassed what was 
necessary by submitting an affidavit sufficient to establish standing at even the 
summary judgment phase.  (JA 194-98).   
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 While the trial court chose not to consider the affidavit, (JA 461 n.2)5, this 
Court—in its appellate position—should consider them, as there is ample authority 
allowing them to be considered on appeal.  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Agric. 
Stabilization & Conservation Serv., 901 F.2d 673, 675, 677 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(analyzing appellants’ affidavits on injury and then reversing trial court’s 
dismissal for lack of standing); Goos v. I.C.C., 911 F.2d 1283, 1290 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(examining appellant’s affidavit to conclude that appellant had a “sufficient 
personal stake in the outcome to meet the injury in fact requirement”). 
 Indeed, the Supreme Court has “strongly suggest[ed]” that parties “take 
pains to supplement the record in any manner necessary to enable us to address 
with as much precision as possible any question of standing that may be raised.”  
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).  Hill did just that with her 
affidavit, which facilitates appellate review of her standing and of this Court’s 
jurisdiction.  While her allegations in just the amended complaint are sufficient, 
her affidavit further cements her showing of injury. 
 Hill reiterates in her affidavit that she does not want to buy any medical 
insurance policy providing those benefits required by the Individual Mandate.  Hill 
                                           
5 Plaintiffs do not premise their appeal on the trial court restricting its review to the 
amended complaint.  Rather, Plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s conclusion that 
the amended complaint was insufficient to confer standing. 
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supported her claim with a level of specificity that should have been understood by 
the district court when it considered the motion to dismiss: 
• The Individual Mandate requires coverage for “‘substance abuse disorder 
services,’ ‘preventative and wellness services and chronic disease 
management,’ ‘pediatric services,’ and ‘maternity and newborn care.’”  Hill 
Aff. ¶ 9 (JA 195).  
• “I am not pregnant; I do not need ‘pediatric services;’ I do not suffer from 
‘chronic disease;’ nor do I have a ‘substance abuse disorder.’”  Hill Aff. ¶ 10 
(JA 195).  
• “I do not want to purchase any health insurance policy mandated by the 
PPACA.”  Hill Aff. ¶ 14 (JA 196).  
• The Individual Mandate “mandates that I purchase a certain health insurance 
policy which includes coverage I do not want to purchase.”  Hill Aff. ¶ 16 
(JA 197). 
• “I wish to exercise my legally protected right . . . to not purchase the health 
insurance policy mandated by [the Individual Mandate] . . . .”  Hill Aff. ¶ 17 
(JA 197).   
 The Individual Mandate causes Samantha Hill an “injury in fact.”  She thus 
has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Individual Mandate. 
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E. Samantha Hill alleged an “injury in fact” from a law that will 
penalize her financially for not buying an unwanted medical 
insurance policy.   
“Should Samantha Hill not purchase this federally-mandated health 
insurance policy, PPACA imposes a financial penalty upon her.” 
Amended Complaint, ¶ 153 (JA 120). 
_______________________________ 
 
1. Hill alleged an “injury in fact” in the amended complaint. 
Hill has also sufficiently alleged an “injury in fact” in Count Six that 
challenges the Individual Mandate because it imposes an unconstitutional penalty.  
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 148-57.  (JA 118-21). 
 Hill sufficiently alleged that a penalty will be imposed on her if she fails to 
comply with the statute that she challenges as unconstitutional.  See Am. Compl. 
¶ 153 (JA 120) (“Should Samantha Hill not purchase this federally-mandated 
health insurance policy, PPACA imposes a financial penalty upon her.”)  See also 
Am. Compl. ¶ 142 (JA 116) (“Should Samantha Hill not purchase this mandated 
health-care coverage, the PPACA imposes a financial penalty upon her, and others 
similarly situated.”).  The penalty is designed to “force individuals to purchase 
health insurance from private companies and fund the federal government’s health 
care regulatory scheme through coerced payments to private companies offering a 
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product regulated, defined, controlled, and mandated by the federal government.”  
Am. Compl. ¶ 153 (JA 120).   
 Again, not only should these allegations be taken as true, Gardner, 294 F.3d 
at 993, they are in fact true.  Hill alleges the Individual Mandate imposes “shared 
responsibility penalties” on those, such as herself, who do not purchase the 
federally mandated health insurance policy.  Am. Compl. ¶ 153-57 (JA 120-21).  
And under the text of the Individual Mandate: “If an individual fails to meet the 
requirement [to maintain minimum essential coverage] . . . there is imposed a 
penalty with respect to the individual . . . .”  See Section 1501, 124 Stat. at 244-49 
(26 U.S.C. § 5000A).       
The trial court was also wrong when it concluded Hill should be dismissed 
because she did not definitively plead she would flout the law: 
Hill does not assert that she will not purchase a 
qualifying policy in 2014 and, as a result, it is unclear 
whether a financial penalty will be imposed upon her.  
Because it is unclear whether a financial penalty will be 
imposed upon her, Hill has failed to allege that she will 
sustain an injury.  
(JA 470). 
The trial court erred because Hill did allege (as discussed above) that she 
clearly and unequivocally does not want to comply with this mandate – and 
thereby would be subject to this unconstitutional penalty. 
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This Court has “entertained constitutional challenges where the statute 
clearly applies to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has stated a desire not to comply 
with its mandate.”  Gray, 567 F.3d at 987 (citing additional cases).  Hill’s 
allegations that she does not want to purchase the minimum coverage imposed on 
her by the Individual Mandate are sufficient to confer standing—and for good 
reason – because any other rule would promote law-breaking.   
The well-settled rule in this Circuit provides that a plaintiff challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute need not first violate the statute for there to be 
standing.  Rather, in line with “good public policy by breeding respect for the law,” 
a person aggrieved by a law she considers unconstitutional is encouraged to seek a 
declaratory judgment, all the while complying with the challenged law.  St. Paul 
Area Chamber of Commerce, 439 F.3d at 488.   
[W]e observe that it would turn respect for the law on its 
head for us to conclude that [plaintiff] lacks standing to 
challenge the provision merely because [plaintiff] chose 
to comply with the statute and challenge its 
constitutionality, rather than to violate the law and await 
an enforcement action. 
Id. (citing Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 
1007 (9th Cir. 2003)).   
Hill’s allegation in the amended complaint (that a penalty will be imposed 
upon her for non-compliance with the Individual Mandate) is sufficient to allege an 
“injury in fact.”  Under the trial court’s erroneous view, Hill would not have 
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 37      Date Filed: 06/14/2011 Entry ID: 3797395
  27  
 
standing to challenge the Individual Mandate and its penalty until the IRS was 
taking action to collect this mandatory penalty after she failed to buy the mandated 
policy. 
2. Hill’s affidavit further establishes her standing. 
 Hill’s sworn affidavit further establishes that she is subject to the Individual 
Mandate’s penalty provisions:  
• “I am, therefore, an ‘applicable individual,’ subject to the Individual 
Mandate provision of PPACA, which provides that if I fail to meet the 
individual mandate requirement for more than a month, a penalty is imposed 
that must be included in my tax return.” Hill Aff. ¶ 8 (JA 195).  
•  “I do not want to participate in the ‘health care system’ as established and 
defined by PPACA.”  Hill Aff. ¶ 15 (JA 196).  
• “PPACA mandates that I purchase a certain health care insurance policy 
which includes coverage I do not want to purchase.”  Hill Aff. ¶ 16 (JA 
197).  
• “Should I fail to purchase the mandated health insurance coverage, I 
understand PPACA will impose a penalty which I must pay for every month 
. . . .”  Hill Aff. ¶ 18 (JA 197). 
 Hill also details how the threat of the penalty impacts her ability to plan for 
her financial obligations.  Hill Aff. ¶¶ 19-21 (JA 197). 
Hill thus affirms that she does not want to purchase any insurance policy 
providing those benefits required under the Individual Mandate, and that a penalty 
will be imposed upon her for non-compliance.  She need not swear that she will 
violate, or has in fact violated the Individual Mandate as a precondition to 
challenging it.   
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The trial court erred by expecting Hill to allege that she would definitely 
break the law before she could have standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the law.  Hill need not—and indeed should not—break, or threaten to break, the 
law in order to establish standing.  Her allegations in Count Six, that she does not 
want to purchase the required insurance policy and that (under the challenged law) 
a penalty will be imposed for her non-compliance, sufficiently allege an “injury in 
fact” that confirms her standing.    
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F. Hill alleged an “injury in fact” from a law that usurps her rights 
under the Missouri Healthcare Freedom Act to be free from being 
forced to buy unwanted insurance coverage.   
“No law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, 
 any person, employer, or health care provider  
to participate in any health care system.” 
Missouri Health Care Freedom Act,  
MO. REV. STAT. § 1.330.1 (2010) 
_______________________________ 
 
Hill has also sufficiently alleged an “injury in fact” in Count Nine that 
challenges the Individual Mandate because it infringes her rights under the 
Missouri Health Care Freedom Act, now codified in Missouri Revised Statutes, 
Section 1.330 (2010) (“Freedom Act”).   
Under the Freedom Act,  
Missouri citizens enjoy the protection of Missouri state 
law which guarantees Missouri citizens the right to make 
their own decisions concerning health care insurance – 
including the right that “[n]o law or rule” – federal, state, 
or otherwise – “shall compel, directly or indirectly, any 
person, employer, or health care provider to participate in 
any health care system.”   
 
Am. Compl. ¶ 207 (JA 134) (emphasis supplied). 
“[T]he Supremacy Clause does not grant the federal government with 
sufficient authority to mandate Missouri citizens purchase a specific medical 
insurance policy, when under Missouri state law, these citizens – such as Samantha 
Hill – are guaranteed the right to define for themselves what healthcare insurance 
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coverage is appropriate.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 210 (JA 135).  The Individual Mandate 
“mandates Missouri citizens to buy a particular type and nature of health care 
insurance policy.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 211 (JA 136).  The Individual Mandate 
“abrogates the rights Samantha Hill, and similarly situated Missouri citizens, enjoy 
[under] the Missouri Health Care Freedom Act.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 212 (JA 136).  
The Individual Mandate “violates these Missouri citizens’ right to determine their 
own appropriate health care, a right they have under Missouri’s Health Care 
Freedom Act.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 213 (JA 136).  These allegations sufficiently allege 
Hill’s “injury in fact” caused by the Individual Mandate.   
Far surpassing the “relatively modest” standard at the pleading stage, 
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 170-71, Hill’s affidavit further establishes her standing to 
assert this claim.  Hill affirms, 
I wish to exercise my legally protected right pursuant to 
the Missouri Health Care Freedom Act to not purchase 
the health insurance policy mandated by PPACA or 
otherwise participate in the “health care system” 
established by PPACA. 
Hill Aff. ¶ 17 (JA 197).  
The trial court erred in two respects.  First, the trial court ruled that Hill can 
comply by buying the mandated “catastrophic plan.”  (JA 470).  But, as discussed 
above, Hill said she would not buy this PPACA “catastrophic” plan and the trial 
court reached its conclusion by flatly ignoring Hill’s repeated allegations.  (See pp. 
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16-23, supra.)  Thus, there is a direct conflict between Hill’s right under the 
Freedom Act and the Individual Mandate of PPACA. 
Second, the trial court side-stepped this issue by misreading the Freedom 
Act.  The court stated, “Hill does not allege that she currently does not participate 
in a health care system, only that she does not have health insurance.”  (JA 470).  
But health insurance is the fundamental feature of the Freedom Act’s definition of 
the “health care system”: 
[A]ny public or private entity whose function or purpose 
is the management of, processing of, enrollment of 
individuals for or payment for, in full or in part, health 
care services or health care data or health care 
information for its participants.   
MO. REV. STAT. § 1.330.5(3) (2010) (emphasis added).    
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 Indeed, protecting Missouri citizens’ right to refuse to purchase a health 
insurance policy was the Freedom Act’s primary purpose.6  The Freedom Act 
enshrines the right of Missouri citizens to be free from being coerced or forced to 
purchase a health insurance policy.  
Missouri Attorney General Koster wrote,   
On August 3, 2010, the people of the state of Missouri 
overwhelmingly passed, by referendum, “Proposition C.”  
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.330.  Proposition C was passed in 
response to the ACA, and prohibits compelling “any 
person, employer, or health care provider to participate in 
any health care system.” Id.  § 1.330.1.  The ACA and 
Proposition C are in conflict.  
(JA 432) (emphasis supplied). 
                                           
6 See H.B. 1764, Bill text as truly agreed to and finally passed, 95th Gen. Assemb., 
2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010), http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/ 
bills101/billpdf/truly/HB1764T.PDF, p. 1, (last visited June 12, 2011) (“AN ACT 
To repeal section 375.1175, RSMo, and to enact in lieu thereof two new sections 
relating to insurance, with a referendum clause.”) (emphasis added); id., p. 3 
(“[T]he official ballot title of this act shall be as follows: ‘Shall the Missouri 
Statutes be amended to: Deny the government authority to penalize citizens for 
refusing to purchase private health insurance . . . .”) (emphasis added); 2010 
Ballot Measures, MISSOURI SECRETARY OF STATE, Proposition C, 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2010ballot/ (last visited June 12, 2011) (“Fair 
Ballot Language: A ‘yes’ vote will amend Missouri law to deny the government 
authority to penalize citizens for refusing to purchase private health insurance . . 
. .”) (initial emphasis omitted, subsequent emphasis added).   
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 By forcing Hill to purchase a health insurance policy she does not want, the 
Individual Mandate is a direct violation of her rights under the Missouri Freedom 
Act.  Hill has alleged in Count Nine, an “injury in fact” by the Individual Mandate 
infringing her rights under the Freedom Act.   
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G. Peter Kinder alleged an “injury in fact” such that he has standing 
to challenge the Individual Mandate.  
“Kinder . . . and the Plaintiffs as citizens of Missouri and Missouri 
taxpayers, enjoy the protections afforded them by the United States 
and Missouri Constitutions, including the right to be free from 
unwarranted federal intrusion and interference.” 
Amended Complaint. ¶ 69.  (JA 98-99). 
_______________________________ 
 
 Because Hill has standing, this Court has jurisdiction over this case.  Where 
one plaintiff establishes standing to sue, the standing of other plaintiffs is 
immaterial to jurisdiction.  Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 2006).  
Thus, because Hill has standing, the Court need not reach the question of whether 
Kinder has standing. 
 In any event, Kinder also has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Individual Mandate.   
 The allegations of the amended complaint establish Kinder’s standing.  In 
particular ( in addition to the quote noted above) the amended complaint provides: 
• The Individual Mandate “limits the options and choices of health-care 
coverage available to Lieutenant Governor Kinder and other Missouri state 
employees and its elected officials.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 82 (JA 102). 
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• Under Count Five, the earlier allegations are incorporated by reference.  Am. 
Compl. ¶ 127 (JA 113).7 
• The Individual mandate imposes a financial penalty upon Hill “and others 
similarly situated.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 142 (JA 116). 
• The Individual Mandate is unconstitutional as to Hill “and other similarly 
situated Missouri citizens and must be invalidated.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 147 (JA 
118). 
• Under Count Six, the earlier allegations are incorporated by reference.  Am. 
Compl. ¶ 148 (JA 118). 
• The penalties under Section 1501 of the Individual Mandate are an 
unconstitutional imposition of a direct tax “as to Samantha Hill and other 
similarly situated Missouri citizens, and thus, must be invalidated.”  Am. 
Compl. ¶ 157 (JA 121). 
• Under Count Nine, the federal government does not have “sufficient 
authority to mandate Missouri citizens purchase a specific health care 
insurance policy.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 210 (JA 135). 
• The Individual Mandate “mandates Missouri citizens to buy a particular type 
and nature of health care insurance policy.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 211 (JA 136). 
• The Individual Mandate “abrogates the rights Samantha Hill, and similarly 
situated Missouri citizens, enjoy [under] the Missouri Health Care Freedom 
Act.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 212 (JA 136). 
• “Because it violates constitutionally-protected liberty interests belonging to 
Samantha Hill and other Missouri citizens, without due process of law, [the 
Individual Mandate] violates these Missouri citizens’ right to determine their 
own appropriate health care, a right they have under Missouri’s Health Care 
Freedom Act.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 213 (JA 136). 
                                           
7 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), which permits the pleader to incorporate by reference 
prior allegations to encourage short, concise pleadings that are free of unwarranted 
repetition and to promote convenience in pleading. 
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• “Peter D. Kinder is a Missouri citizen . . . .”  Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (JA 84). 
 The trial court erred by ignoring these allegations establishing that Kinder 
has standing.  The trial court simply ruled that it will “not consider the merits of 
Kinder’s claims that are not included in the Amended Complaint.”  (JA 469).   
But the district court did not even consider the allegations that were made in 
the amended complaint.  The district court also ignored the presumptions that (1) 
all inferences are to be construed in favor of plaintiff and that (2) the general 
allegations are presumed to embrace the specific facts necessary to support 
jurisdiction.  See Constitution Party, 639 F.3d at 420-21; Gray, 567 F.3d at 976.  
Kinder’s allegations in the amended complaint sufficiently establish his standing to 
assert these claims.  The trial court simply chose – for whatever reason – to ignore 
the plain language of the amended complaint in order to dismiss Lt. Governor 
Kinder’s claim on the pretext that he lacked standing. 
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H. Kinder sufficiently alleged an “injury in fact” in his affidavit. 
Following the Supreme Court’s strong suggestion that parties “take pains to 
supplement the record in any manner necessary to enable us to address with as 
much precision as possible any question of standing that may be raised,”  Pennell, 
485 U.S. at 8, Kinder’s affidavit further cements his standing to assert these claims.   
 Kinder affirms he is an “applicable person” subject to the Individual 
Mandate.  Kinder Aff. ¶ 13 (JA 187).  While he is currently eligible for the state 
employee health insurance plan, his eligibility depends on his position as 
Lieutenant Governor, and such eligibility does not extend beyond his current term 
of office – which ends January 2013.  Kinder Aff. ¶¶ 15-16 (JA 187).   
So, when the Individual Mandate and its penalty provisions become 
enforceable in January 2014, there is—at a minimum—a realistic danger that 
Kinder would be subject to their full force.  A conclusion that Kinder will—with 
absolute certainty—be subject to the Individual Mandate in 2014 is not required.  
All that is required is a showing of “realistic danger” that his eligibility for the state 
health plan will be over and that he would then be subject to the Individual 
Mandate.  See St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce, 439 F.3d at 485.  He has 
shown just that. 
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 While the trial court did not address the allegations of injury Kinder made in 
the amended complaint, choosing rather to ignore the facts provided in his 
affidavit, these statements unequivocally establish that Kinder has sufficiently 
alleged an “injury in fact” due to the Individual Mandate.  He thus has standing to 
challenge the Individual Mandate. 
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II. This Court can and should proceed to determine whether the Individual 
Mandate is unconstitutional. 
“Nothing would be gained by postponing a decision, and the public 
interest would be well served by a prompt resolution of the 
constitutionality” of the law. 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.  
473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985) 
_______________________________ 
 
The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he matter of what questions may be 
taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the 
discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”  
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976).  There is no general rule, but 
“[c]ertainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified in 
resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond 
any doubt or where ‘injustice might otherwise result.’”  Id.  (internal citation 
omitted).   
This is one of those circumstances.  Indeed, the need for this Court to reach 
the merits is even more compelling and proper in this case.  No further factual 
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development is necessary.  And, on those facts before the trial court (and in the 
record before this court), the substantive issue is fully developed.8 
Where issues of law exist and the parties have briefed and argued the issue 
on appeal; and, where refusing to determine the issue might result in injustice, 
courts of appeals uniformly exercise their discretion to entertain the issue on 
appeal.  In re Modern Textile, Inc., 900 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing 
Cleland v. United States, 874 F.2d 517, 522 n.6 (8th Cir. 1989)).   
This Court is empowered to proceed to the merits where the trial court did 
not reach the  issue because it wrongly dismissed the case on standing.  Doing so 
here would follow a well-trodden path in this Circuit.  See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of 
Labor v. Rapid Robert’s Inc., 130 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1997) (deciding issue of 
statutory basis for penalties because record was “well-developed and amenable to 
our review,” party briefed and argued its position on appeal, and opposing party 
“had the opportunity to respond”); Seniority Research Grp. v. Chrysler Motor 
Corp., 976 F.2d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir. 1992) (determining issue relating to 
                                           
8 The district court dismissed the claims of all seven Missouri plaintiffs.  This 
appeal involves only the challenges to the Individual Mandate.  The district court 
was wrong to dismiss these other claims.  But, because (unlike the Individual 
Mandate) these other claims would require a remand and because a remand would 
delay resolution of this case, only the challenge to the Individual Mandate has been 
appealed. 
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collective-bargaining agreement not decided by trial court); Warren v. City of 
Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436 (8th Cir. 1989) (opting to exercise discretion to determine 
whether there was probable cause even where that issue was not raised in trial 
court); Pfoutz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 527, 530 n.3 (8th Cir. 
1988) (deciding issue under a state motor vehicle statute that the trial court made 
no reference to and parties did not raise until appellate oral argument because the 
“new theory relied on by this court addresses a legal matter rather than a factual 
matter” and “the parties had a chance to respond to the statutory argument, both at 
oral argument and by supplementary letter brief.”).  But cf. Sanders v. Clemco 
Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 217-18 (8th Cir. 1987) (recognizing authority to decide an 
issue not passed upon by trial court, but ultimately remanding statute of limitations 
issue because there was an insufficient factual record on whether a party acted with 
due diligence in obtaining service of process). 
Here, this Court can and should reach the merits of whether the Individual 
Mandate is unconstitutional.  Plaintiffs explain why the Individual Mandate is 
unconstitutional in this brief.  Defendants have a full opportunity to respond 
through briefing and oral argument.  The parties deserve an expeditious 
determination of this issue, and remand would only serve to delay an inevitable 
return to this Court.  This delay would impose a considerable hardship on the 
parties, and also on the citizens and governments of other states in this Circuit, 
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because the constitutionality of the Individual Mandate and its penalty provisions 
would continue to remain in limbo.   As the Missouri Attorney General Koster 
noted in his brief to the Eleventh Circuit, “[T]he State of Missouri has an interest 
in the application of the ACA and in this Court’s determination of the validity of 
its provisions under the United States Constitution.”  (JA 432). 
While there is no dispute that the Individual Mandate is justiciable on 
ripeness grounds,9 the case law on ripeness is instructive.  For example, in Thomas 
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568 (1985), the Court 
determined that the question of the validity of a pesticide regulatory scheme was 
purely legal, that the issue would not be clarified by further factual development, 
and that it was thus ripe for review.  Id. at 581.  “Nothing would be gained by 
postponing a decision, and the public interest would be well served by a prompt 
                                           
9 See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974) 
(“Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is 
patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be 
a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect.”); Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942) (a regulation “sets a 
standard of conduct for all to whom its terms apply” and it “operates as such in 
advance of the imposition of sanctions upon any particular individual.”); S. Dakota 
Min. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lawrence Cnty., 155 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 1998) (a plaintiff 
need not await consummation of threatened injury before bringing a declaratory 
judgment action;an action is ripe for adjudication if the plaintiff faces an injury that 
is “certainly impending.”).   
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resolution of the constitutionality” of the law.  Id.  In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190 
(1983), the Supreme Court held that the issue of whether a state law regulating 
construction of nuclear power plants was preempted was ripe for review because it 
was “predominantly legal” and “postponement of decision would likely work 
substantial hardship on the utilities” and “may ultimately work harm on the 
citizens of California.”  Id. at 201-02.   
Even where, as here, a claim is unquestionably ripe, these cases support this 
Court determining sooner rather than later whether the Individual Mandate is 
unconstitutional.  The Individual Mandate hangs over the heads of Hill and Kinder, 
and over the millions of others subject to its provisions, “like the sword over 
Damocles, creating a ‘here-and-now-subservience.’”  See Metro. Wash. Airports 
Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noises, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 265 n.13 
(1991).   
They must take steps now to prepare for the Individual Mandate’s 
enforcement.  Hill Aff. ¶¶ 19-21 (JA 197) (discussing how Hill must make 
financial arrangements now and forego spending because of the Individual 
Mandate and that planning for the future “requires that I know whether I will be 
assessed a penalty for not buying the insurance mandated” by the PPACA).   
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Moreover, Missouri and other states in this Circuit would be seriously 
harmed by further delay in the determination of whether the Individual Mandate is 
unconstitutional.  Moreover, these states are forced to prepare now by enacting 
legislation for the administration of a massive overhaul of the healthcare system 
and regulation of insurance—thereby causing enormous expenditure of 
resources—for what could be a waste if the Individual Mandate is struck down.   
As this Court is aware, PPACA and the Individual Mandate have already 
been held unconstitutional by two district courts.  Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 11-1057 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 
2011); Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., __ F. Supp. 2d. __, 2011 
WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-11021 (11th Cir. 
Mar. 9, 2011).  Those cases are now on appeal in the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits; 
but this is the only challenge now pending before this Circuit. 
The federal government too would benefit from knowing (sooner rather than 
later) whether this key provision of the PPACA is unconstitutional.  From all 
perspectives, an early and expedited determination on the merits is warranted and 
wise.   
Remanding this issue to the district court makes no sense.  If the issue were 
remanded to the trial court – no matter what the court ruled – it would inevitably 
and eventually find its way back to this Court on appeal.  And, there would be no 
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deference given to the trial court’s ruling on this purely legal issue.  Questions 
involving the constitutionality of a federal statute are reviewed de novo.  United 
States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1397 (8th Cir. 1996).  By deciding this issue 
now, there is no concern about disturbing any lower court ruling that should be 
afforded deference.  There is also no factual record to further develop.  The 
provisions of the Individual Mandate are settled, and there is no dispute as to what 
they say. 
This Court can and should now decide whether the Individual Mandate is 
unconstitutional.  Because the parties have a full opportunity to brief and argue the 
merits of the claims before this Court, it is entirely proper for this Court to proceed 
to the merits.  See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 174-75 n.4 (1983) (The 
Supreme Court assumed that it was proper for the Court of Appeals—after 
reversing the trial court on jurisdictional grounds, and after noting that a case 
presented a pure question of law that had been briefed and argued by the parties—
to then proceed to determine the constitutionality of a flag display law.)       
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III. The Individual Mandate is unconstitutional. 
“The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited;  
and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the 
Constitution is written.  
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that 
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may at any time be 
passed by those intended to be restrained? 
The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited 
powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons  
on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed 
are of equal obligation.  
It is a proposition too plain to be contested that the Constitution 
controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . . .” 
Marbury v. Madison,  
5 U.S. 137, 176-77 (1803)  
_______________________________ 
 
A. Standard of review is de novo. 
Questions involving the constitutionality of a federal statute are reviewed de 
novo.  United States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1397 (8th Cir. 1996). 
B. The Individual Mandate compels individuals to enter commerce 
and buy a specific product mandated by Congress. 
The Individual Mandate requires that every American (including Hill and 
Kinder) obtain an insurance policy providing “minimum essential coverage” — as 
Congress has defined such coverage.  Compliance with the mandate is enforced by 
a monetary penalty imposed monthly upon every individual who has not bought 
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the mandated health insurance policy.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A.  Exceptions (irrelevant 
to Hill or Kinder) are for those individuals with a religious objection, those not 
lawfully in the country, and those who are incarcerated.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d). 
C. The Individual Mandate exceeds Congress’s power under even 
the outer limits of the Commerce Clause.  
1. In order to protect individual liberty, those powers granted 
Congress under the Constitution are few and defined. 
Congress may not pass any law it wants.  Congress’s authority is 
constitutionally limited to only acting on those enumerated powers that “we the 
people” have granted Congress in our Constitution.  And, when Congress passes a 
law that exceeds it constitutional authority, the law is invalid.   
As John Marshall noted, “… a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is 
not law; if [not] then written Constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the 
people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.”  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.  
Congress’s power is “defined and limited; and that those limits may not be 
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803) 
(Marhsall, C.J.)).  See also id. at 616 n.7 (emphasizing that the Constitutional 
system was crafted so that the “people’s rights would be secured by the division of 
power”).   A federal government that possessed an unlimited general police power 
could run roughshod over the states and citizens alike.  Vesting such power in a 
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centralized federal government is a threat to all free people and is contrary to the 
foundational principles upon which our Republic is established. 
 The Supreme Court described this as a constitutional “first principle.”  The 
powers granted the federal government are “few and defined,” while those that 
remain in the states are numerous and indefinite.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 552 (1995) (citing The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-93).  This constitutional 
framework secures the protection of fundamental liberties of citizens, for “a 
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will 
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 
(citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).  The Tenth Amendment 
likewise declares this central constitutional principle.     
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 
U.S. CONST., amend. X (emphasis added). 
2. When the Constitution was written, Congress’s authority under 
the Commerce Clause was understood to concern only 
regulation of economic trade between states. 
 The Commerce Clause granted Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
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 The Supreme Court has “always [] rejected readings of the Commerce 
Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a 
police power.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (emphasis in original) (citing Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring)).  See Amicus Brief of Missouri 
Attorney General (JA 438-47). 
 The Commerce Clause was originally considered in the context of state-
imposed barriers to commerce.  In the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall held that the Commerce Clause stood 
for the principle of granting open commerce among the states.  Id. at 190.  
“Commerce” as the term was understood when our Constitution was drafted and 
originally interpreted was defined by Chief Justice Marshall as: 
Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something 
more: it is intercourse.  It described the commercial 
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all 
its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rulings for 
carrying that intercourse.   
Id. at 193.   
“Commerce,” at the time the Constitution was drafted, “consisted of selling, 
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”  Lopez at 585. 
(Thomas, J. concurring).  See also Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the 
Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 863 (2002) (“‘[C]ommerce’ does not seem to have been 
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used during the founding era to refer to those acts that precede the act of trade.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
3. Modern Commerce Clause cases have all limited Congress’s 
authority to regulation of specific economic activity. 
Following the New Deal and the expansion of federal government under the 
Roosevelt Administration, Commerce Clause jurisprudence shifted to cases 
considering the outer limits of Congress’s authority to regulate economic activity.   
This “modern” Commerce Clause jurisprudence considered three broad 
categories of activity which Congress could regulate under the power it was 
granted in the Commerce Clause:   (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the 
instrumentalities; and (3) those activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).   
 Modern Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence is bounded by two 
bookends.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1 (2005), are on one end, upholding federal laws that regulated activity that 
substantially affected interstate commerce.  United States v. Lopez and United 
States v. Morrison are on the other end, striking down federal laws that sought to 
regulate noneconomic activity.  But, all these cases – even Lopez and Morrison 
where Congress exceeded its constitutional authority – involve federal law 
regulating some “activity.” 
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(a) Wickard v. Filburn  
 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, is recognized as the farthest reach of the 
Commerce Clause.   
An Ohio farmer “raise[d] a small acreage of winter wheat, sown in the Fall 
and harvested in the following July; to sell a portion of the crop; to feed part to 
poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold; to use some in making 
flour for home consumption; and to keep the rest for the following seeding.”  Id. at 
114.  The federal Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 controlled the volume of 
wheat in interstate and foreign commerce. Under this Act, farmer Filburn was 
allocated a “wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres and a normal yield of 20.1 
bushels of wheat an acre.  … He sowed, however, 23 acres, and harvested from his 
11.9 acres of excess acreage 239 bushels.  [For violating this Act, Filburn was] 
subject to a penalty of 49 cents a bushel, or $117.11 in all.”  Id. at 114-15.  
(emphasis supplied.) 
Filburn challenged the law saying, “this is a regulation of production and 
consumption of wheat. Such activities are, he urges, beyond the reach of 
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, since they are local in 
character, and their effects upon interstate commerce are at most ‘indirect.’”  Id. at 
119 (emphasis supplied). 
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 The Court upheld the law as a valid regulation of activity substantially 
affecting interstate commerce.  Id. at 125.  The amount of wheat Filburn grew, 
while small, when aggregated with wheat grown by other wheat farmers, had a 
substantial effect upon the price of wheat.  On this basis, the Court held Congress 
could regulate Filburn growing and marketing wheat – including wheat grown for 
consumption on the farm.  The activity reached by the Commerce Clause in 
Wickard was Filburns’s activity of “growing wheat.”  The Court uses the word 
“activity” at least eleven times in its discussion of what Congress regulated under 
the Commerce Clause. 
(b) Gonzalez v. Raich 
 In Raich, patients grew and consumed marijuana for treatment of medical 
conditions.  545 U.S. 1.  Their activities were legal under California state law, but 
violated federal drug laws.  The marijuana growers challenged the federal drug law 
as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.   
 The Supreme Court held that Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
markets for medicinal substances included the segment of those markets that were 
supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally.  The individuals challenging 
the law “are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which 
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there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market.”  545 U.S. at 18 (emphasis 
added).   
 The Court concluded that the California marijuana growers’ activities—i.e., 
their growing and using  marijuana—could satisfy the requirement that an activity 
substantially affect interstate commerce.  See id. at 22, 26.  While the individuals 
were growing the marijuana for their personal use – not for sale to others – the 
restriction was necessary for the implementation of a regulatory scheme (the 
federal narcotics law) aimed at controlling interstate commercial transactions in 
marijuana.  Congress could thus regulate the individuals’ growing and using 
marijuana—quintessential activities.10   
 The individuals in Raich were already growing and using the marijuana.  
They were actively engaged in the activity Congress sought to regulate.   
 There is no case in the history of our Republic that holds the Commerce 
Clause grants Congress the power to force and inactive person to enter the stream 
                                           
10 All Supreme Court cases in the modern era have analyzed laws that sought to 
regulate those who were already engaged in some activity.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
559-60, identifying Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 
U.S. 264 (1981) (coal mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) 
(extortionate credit transactions); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) 
(restaurants using substantial interstate supplies); and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. 
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (hotels catering to interstate guests).   
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of commerce and purchase a specific good or source.  Wickard did not involve a 
law that forced a property owner to grow wheat; it involved a law that regulated an 
active farmer.  Raich did not involve a law that compelled someone to grow or use 
marijuana; it involved a law that prohibited those who already did.   
The government can reasonably argue the Commerce Clause allows 
Congress to regulate insurance companies in the sale and marketing of insurance 
policies or even the type of policies insurance companies may sell.  But, this is 
entirely different from the Individual Mandate which does not involve telling 
insurance companies what type of medical policies they may sell.  Rather, the 
Individual Mandate compels uninsured individuals (who, by definition, have not 
purchased insurance coverage) to buy a specific insurance policy they would 
otherwise not buy.  
On the other end of the spectrum from Wickard and Raich—but equally 
undermining the government’s purported justification for the Individual Mandate— 
are Lopez and Morrison.  These cases struck down federal regulation focused on 
non-economic, local activity. 
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(c) United States v. Lopez 
In Lopez, the Court considered whether Congress had the power under the 
Commerce Clause to enact a law which prohibited carrying a gun at school.  514 
U.S. 549.  The government argued it could because, “the costs of violent crime are 
substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread 
throughout the population.”  Id. at 563-64. 
The Court rejected this argument and held, “[t]he possession of a gun in a 
local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition 
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”  Id. at 567.  To 
sustain this law the Supreme Court said, “we would have to pile inference upon 
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under 
the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”  
Id. 
Also central to the Lopez court’s conclusion was its rejection of the dissent.   
Specifically, the point that, should the law be upheld as a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, it would no longer be possible “to 
identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not.”  Id. at 
564.  Thus, positing a construction of the Commerce Clause which – if accepted – 
leaves no meaningful limits on the commerce power of Congress, is rightly 
rejected for that very reason.   
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(d)  United States v. Morrison 
 In Morrison, the Court held that a federal statute providing a civil remedy 
for victims of gender-motivated violence exceeded Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause.  529 U.S. 598.  “Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, 
in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”   Id. at 613.  Regulation of intrastate 
activity is upheld under the Commerce Clause “only where that activity is 
economic in nature.”  Id.  The Court emphasized again that Congress might use the 
Commerce Clause to “completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between 
national and local authority.”  Id. at 615.  The Court found this concern “well-
founded,” even considering Congress’s “findings” trying to justify the law under 
the Commerce Clause.  Id.11 
 The common thread is that all of these cases focus on some activity in which 
the person or entity was already engaged.  There is no case which has ever held 
that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to compel an individual 
who does not desire to participate in commerce to do so or be punished.   
                                           
11 The Court reiterated too that a finding by Congress that the law regulates an 
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce does not make it so.  Id. at 
614 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2).  Similarly here, a finding by Congress that 
the Individual Mandate or the PPACA regulates an activity affecting interstate 
commerce does not carry the day. 
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4. The Individual Mandate is entirely unlike any prior law passed 
by Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
The Commerce Clause has never been stretched so far as to grant Congress 
the power to compel a person to purchase a product—regardless of its ultimate 
effect on interstate commerce.  Forcing an otherwise unwilling individual to 
purchase a good or service in the private marketplace is well beyond even the 
outermost boundaries of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  And, if held to be 
constitutional, it would practically end the concept of a limited federal government 
of enumerated powers. 
Any attempt by the federal government to claim these constitutional 
principles do not apply because the health care industry is somehow “unique,” has 
no support in any Supreme Court precedent or in fact.  It is absurd to suggest that 
by simply labeling a particular market “unique” Congress is free to act in matters 
relating to that market free of constitutional limitation.  Further, the market for 
healthcare is no more or less “unique” than the market for automobiles, banking, 
housing, or food. 
 If the government can force individuals to buy a medical insurance policy 
today because that person may one day need medical care, this same rationale 
would allow Congress to require every American to buy a coffin or buy a pre-paid 
funeral policy because, after all, we will all die one day. 
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If Congress can regulate inactivity under the guise that the inactivity 
substantially affects interstate commerce there is no longer any limit to 
Congressional power.  The federalist system of enumerated powers would become 
meaningless.   Congress could transform any decision to not act into “activity” 
subject to Congress’s Commerce Clause power. 
To hold the Individual Mandate to be a legitimate exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power would, as noted by the Missouri Attorney General in his 
brief, turn the Commerce Clause into a “generalized police power.”  (JA 434). 
Could Congress assert, under a newly expanded Wickard v. Filburn, 
not only the authority to limit the acres of wheat a farmer in 
Northwest Missouri may plant, but also the power to penalize his 
decision to leave his land fallow, or not to plant, based on the federal 
authority that resting his acreage negatively impacts the price of food? 
* * * 
Can the United States Congress employ an enhanced Commerce 
Clause authority to mandate expectant mothers undergo amniocentesis 
testing in order to identify and treat individuals, yet unborn, whose 
extraordinary medical expenses may someday be cost-shifted onto the 
society-at-large? 
* * * 
To each of these questions, the state of Missouri answers “No.”  
Id. 
Allowing Congress to compel an individual not wanting to participate in 
commerce to, nonetheless, enter commerce and buy a specific product would 
anoint Congress with the power to compel any citizen to engage in any commercial 
activity.  Congress could force individuals to buy a Chevrolet Volt to help the auto 
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industry; it could force individuals to open accounts at banks receiving bailout 
funds; it could force individuals to buy a home with a government-backed 
mortgage rather than renting an apartment.  
 Further, the status of being uninsured is not an economic activity.  The 
government may attempt to distort its target as regulating the “practice of 
consuming health care services without insurance.”  But the Individual Mandate 
does not regulate consumption or health care services; rather it imposes on 
virtually all uninsured individuals the requirement to buy insurance—whether or 
not they consume health care services; and whether or not they have the personal 
financial means to pay for healthcare without insurance. 
 Mandating that people buy health insurance is also a far cry from 
encouraging such activity.  Congress could conceivably devise a constitutionally 
viable way to encourage uninsured individuals to buy health insurance; but they 
have not done so here.   
 What Congress has done is to order every American to buy a federally 
defined product.  Should an individual not comply, Congress granted the IRS 
authority to impose a monthly penalty and collect this penalty.   
 This is not regulation of activity impacting interstate commerce.  This is the 
“nanny-state” using the iron fist of the federal government to coerce citizens to buy 
a product which a bare-majority of Congress happens to think they should buy.  
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This is precisely the type of government tyranny the founders sought to prevent by 
creating a national government with only “few and defined” powers. 
Congress coercing citizens in this manner is repugnant to our constitutional 
system of ordered liberty. 
Our definition of liberty depends upon the meaning of the concept of 
coercion. … By ‘coercion’ we mean such control of the environment 
or circumstances of a person by another that, in order to avoid greater 
evil, he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but 
to serve the ends of another.  … [H]e is unable either to use his own 
intelligence or knowledge or to follow his own aims and beliefs.  
Coercion is evil precisely because it thus eliminates an individual as a 
thinking and valuing person and makes him a bare tool in the 
achievement of the ends of another. 
HAYEK, FRIEDRICH A., THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 20-21 (Univ. of 
Chicago Press 1960). 
 Congress exceeded its constitutional bounds when it enacted the Individual 
Mandate.  The Individual Mandate is thus invalid.   
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D. The Necessary & Proper Clause does not inject validity into an 
otherwise unconstitutional act of Congress. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a stand-alone grant of power.  See 
Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960).  Rather, it gives Congress 
authority to enact legislation that carries into execution enumerated powers granted 
the federal government by the Constitution.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.12  Any 
statute relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause “must itself be legitimately 
predicated on an enumerated power.”  United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. __, 130 
S. Ct. 1949, 1964 (2010).   
Moreover, even if a statute is enacted pursuant to an enumerated power, 
such as the Commerce Clause, it still may not be allowed under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  Its scope and corresponding restraints were famously defined in 
McCulloch v. Maryland: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, 
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, 
are constitutional. 
                                           
12 “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution 
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 
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Id. at 1956 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).  A statute 
can thus be invalidated where it is not consistent with the “letter and spirit of the 
constitution” or where it is not “appropriate.” 
The Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to regulate activities that 
would obstruct it from “carrying into execution” an effective regulation of 
interstate commerce.  As already noted, an individual’s decision to not purchase 
insurance is not an activity.  Further, the uninsured – those not buying medical 
insurance – do not undercut Congress’s regulation of participants in the insurance 
market.  Thus, the Individual Mandate – compelling someone who is not in the 
insurance market to enter that market against their will – is neither “necessary” nor 
“proper” to regulation of medical insurance markets.   
Here, the majority of the factors considered by the Court in Comstock 
undermine any purported justification of the Individual Mandate under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  First, the Individual Mandate is not narrow in 
scope.  Rather, it imposes this mandate on persons as a condition of being legally 
present in this country. This excessively broad scope stands in stark contrast to the 
narrow scope of the statute in Comstock that applied to a “small fraction of federal 
prisoners” – just 105 individuals out of over 188,000 federal inmates.  See id. at 
1964. 
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Second, the Individual Mandate does not accommodate state interests, but 
rather collides head-on with them.  The Individual Mandate conflicts directly with 
the Freedom Act (along with many other similar state laws) protecting the rights of 
Missouri citizens to be free from government coercion in buying health insurance.  
The conflict between PPACA and Missouri’s state interest contrasts greatly with 
the statute in Comstock, which expressly required accommodation of state 
interests.  See id. at 1962-63.   
Third, the Individual Mandate is unsupported by a long history of federal 
involvement in individual health insurance matters.  The long-standing prohibition 
against congressional regulation in insurance in general was not lifted until 1944.  
See United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533.  Prior to PPACA, 
states were the primary regulator of insurance markets and terms of medical 
insurance in their respective state as an exercise of their police power.  This 
contrasts greatly with the Court’s reliance in Comstock on the 155-year history of 
federal involvement in the field related to federal prisoners.  130 S. Ct. at 1958-59. 
The Individual Mandate’s substantial intrusion upon individual liberties and 
invasion of states’ health and police powers, thereby disrupting the state-federal 
balance, violate the “letter and spirit of the constitution.”  The Individual Mandate 
is thus an inappropriate and improper congressional enactment under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
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E. The “shared responsibility penalty” for violating the Individual 
Mandate is not a lawful exercise of Congress’s “taxing” power.   
1. If the “shared responsibility penalties” are a “tax,” they are an 
unlawful exercise of the taxing power because they are an un-
apportioned, direct tax. 
By its own terms, the “shared responsibility penalties” are not a tax.  They 
are a penalty adopted as a means – and with the purpose – of forcing individuals to 
comply with the Individual Mandate.  Thus, on its face, this penalty cannot be 
justified as a “tax” adopted by Congress under its taxing power in order to raise 
revenue.  
To the extent the penalties under the Individual Mandate are considered a 
“tax”, they are unconstitutional as an un-apportioned direct tax.   Congress has the 
“power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises . . . .”  U.S. CONST., art. 
I, § 8, cl. 1.  The Constitution limits this power, however, as “[n]o capitation, or 
other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration 
herein before directed to be taken.”  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.  The Sixteenth 
Amendment carves out income taxes as valid, even though un-apportioned.  But 
there is no valid basis for Congress to impose a direct, un-apportioned tax on 
individuals on the grounds that they lack health insurance. 
The Supreme Court has warned that the Sixteenth Amendment,  
shall not be extended by loose construction, so as to 
repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those 
provisions of the Constitution that require an 
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apportionment according to population for direct taxes 
upon property, real and person.  This limitation still has 
an appropriate and important function, and is not to be 
overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts.  
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920). 
The federal government does not have the power to impose a direct tax upon 
a person nor to impose a direct tax that is not apportioned among the states.  The 
Individual Mandate violates these constitutional provisions, as it creates a taxable 
event based on a person’s failure to maintain “minimum essential coverage.”  It is 
thus levied directly on the person, not on the person’s income.  
Moreover, it is not apportioned among the states, as each state would have a 
different percentage of its citizens on whom the penalty would be imposed.  Proper 
apportionment might include different amounts of tax based on factors like each 
state’s age distribution or general health status, or the extent of each state’s 
provision of healthcare to its citizens.  But the Individual Mandate’s penalty is un-
apportioned and is thus an unconstitutional direct tax.      
2. If the “shared responsibility penalties” are not a tax, they 
necessarily cannot be a lawful exercise of Congress’s “taxing” 
power. 
The penalties for an individual violating the Individual Mandate are not a 
tax.  These penalty provisions thus, by definition, cannot fall under Congress’s 
“power to lay and collect taxes.”  “[T]here comes a time in the extension of the 
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and 
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becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.”  
Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) (citing 
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)).  The Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed the distinction between a “tax” as “an enforced contribution to provide 
for the support of government,” and a “penalty” as “an exaction imposed by statute 
as punishment for an unlawful act.”  United States v. Reorganized CF&I 
Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996) (citing United States v. La 
Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)). 
The Individual Mandate’s punitive enforcement features, i.e., its “shared 
responsibility penalties”—as their name suggests—punish an individual’s failure 
or refusal to purchase the mandated level of health insurance.  To the extent they 
are not a tax, they would thus not be a valid exercise of Congress’s “taxing” power. 
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F. The Individual Mandate violates the rights Plaintiffs as citizens of 
Missouri are guaranteed under the Freedom Act. 
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected a generalized federal police 
power and affirmed this general power is held only by the states.  Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 618-19.   
With its careful enumeration of federal powers and 
explicit statement that all powers not granted to the 
Federal Government are reserved, the Constitution 
cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the Federal 
Government an unlimited license to regulate. 
Id. at 618 n.8.  See also Raich, 545 U.S. at 50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Missouri voters overwhelmingly passed the Freedom Act. (See, discussion 
supra I.F.)  This law guarantees to Samantha Hill and Peter Kinder a right to decide 
– free from governmental coercion – whether to buy medical insurance.  The 
Freedom Act provides, “[n]o law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any 
person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any health care system.” 
We recognize, of course, under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, 
cl 2, federal law displaces contrary state law.  But, federal preemption can occur 
only when the federal law is constitutional in the first place.  As we show above, 
the Individual Mandate is not. 
Further, the Supremacy Clause “start[s] with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless 
that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
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Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  Moreover, preemption provisions must be 
construed narrowly, “in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of state 
police power regulations.”  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 
(1992).    
The Freedom Act was adopted pursuant to traditional police powers reserved 
to the state of Missouri.  The Individual Mandate disregards the state-federal 
balance enshrined in the Constitution; and it deprives without due process of law 
the constitutionally protected liberty interests the Freedom Act guarantees Missouri 
citizens (including Kinder and Hill) to determine their own appropriate health care. 
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CONCLUSION 
Samantha Hill and Peter Kinder each has standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Individual Mandate.  The trial court’s dismissal of their 
constitutional challenge to the Individual Mandate is without merit and should be 
reversed. 
Moreover, this Court can, and should, reach the merits of whether the 
Individual Mandate is unconstitutional.  And, this Court should declare this law to 
be unconstitutional as applied to Samantha Hill and Peter Kinder. 
To do otherwise would be to ignore Chief Justice Marshall’s foundational 
admonition: “To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that 
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those 
intended to be restrained?  The distinction between a government with limited and 
unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons  
on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal 
obligation.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-77.  
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